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Introduction:   Accurate information on farmer 
and consumer behavior is the foundation for 
identifying public investments and policies that can 
effectively promote national food security and 
income growth objectives. This policy brief 
summarizes recent findings from a study on 
smallholder crop marketing behavior and urban 
consumption patterns in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. The full report is downloadable from the 
website above.  
 
Importance of various crop categories in 
smallholder farm incomes:  The report highlights 
seven main findings about smallholder crop 
production and marketing behavior: 
1.  Maize is generally the single most important 
crop in smallholder farm incomes: When adding 
the value of production and sales, maize accounts 
for 44%, 41%, 26% and 23% of farm income in 
Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, and Mozambique, 
respectively, according to recent national surveys. 
The importance of maize varies greatly by region. 
Maize accounts for as much as 70% of farm income 
in some areas (generally those of relatively high 
agro-ecological potential), and less than 10% in 
others (generally the semi-arid areas). In general, 
maize accounts for a slightly higher share of total 
income on relatively large farms, except in Malawi 












































Mean share (%) in total gross farm income 
1-Low  672  22%  3%  6% 2% 23% 11% 11%  21%  .9%
2  950  20%  5%  6% 3% 19% 12% 14%  20%  1.1%
3-Mid  1,259  18%  5%  5% 3% 17% 12% 17%  22%  1.3%
4  1,465  19%  8%  4% 3% 16% 13% 14%  23%  .9%
5-High  2,711  15%  13%  3% 7% 10% 10% 12%  31%  .7%
Total  1,408  19%  7%  5% 4% 17% 12% 14%  23%  1.0%
Source: Tegemeo Institute/Egerton University Farm Household Survey, 2007. note:  * primarily fresh fruits, 
vegetables, and legumes.  
 
 
  1Table 1b.  Zambia - Household Share of Components in Total Gross Farm Income by Landholding  







































Mean share (%) in total gross farm income 
1-Low  241  35%  3%  18%  1%  14%  4%  0%  12%  13% 
2  336  37%  5%  21%  3%  15%  6%  2%  7%  4% 
3-Mid  461  33%  7%  20%  3%  16%  7%  5%  8%  2% 
4  609  33%  9%  15%  3%  15%  8%  6%  9%  2% 
5-High  1,426  30%  15%  12%  4%  12%  9%  6%  12%  2% 
Total  615  33%  8%  17%  3%  14%  7%  4%  9%  4% 
Source: Central Statistical Office Supplemental Post Harvest Survey, 2008. note:  * primarily fresh fruits, 
vegetables, and legumes.  
 
 
Table 1c.  Malawi - Household Share of Components in Total Gross Farm Income by Landholding  






































Mean share (%) in total gross farm income 
1-Low  75  48.1%  2.5%  9.8%  1.3%  12.5%  2.0%  2.0%  5.8%  16.1% 
2  96  44.0%  2.9%  8.7%  2.1%  15.3%  4.2%  2.1%  5.0%  15.5% 
3-Mid  108  43.9%  3.0%  8.1%  1.9%  14.9%  4.8%  4.4%  5.5%  13.6% 
4  127  39.3%  2.7%  9.1%  2.6%  15.6%  6.2%  8.8%  6.3%  9.4% 
5-High  314  30.9%  3.7%  8.4%  2.7%  13.1%  6.7%  18.5%  6.7%  9.3% 
Total  144  41.3%  3.0%  8.8%  2.1%  14.2%  4.8%  7.3%  5.9%  12.7% 
Source: National Statistical Office Agricultural Inputs Support Survey, 2007. note:  * primarily fresh fruits, 
vegetables, and legumes.  
 
 
Table 1d.  Mozambique - Household Share of Components in Total Gross Farm Income by Landholding 







































Mean share (%) in total gross farm income 
1-Low  112.5  14.6  1.1  40.6 1.6 23.4 8.0 .4  2.7  4.5
2  138.4  18.3  1.5  39.3 1.2 21.5 8.6 1.3  3.0  3.2
3-Mid  170.6  20.8  2.5  35.0 1.7 18.4 9.2 2.7  4.2  2.6
4  213.9  21.6  2.9  34.3 1.4 17.9 9.1 4.6  3.9  2.4
5-High  382.3  24.1  4.6  28.5 1.5 14.2 8.4 8.8  6.1  1.2
Total  203.5  20.6  2.5  37.5 1.5 19.1 8.6 3.4  4.2  2.6
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and National Institute of Statistics Trabalho do  
 Inquerto Agricola Survey, 2005. note:  * primarily fresh fruits, vegetables, and legumes. 
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2.  Fresh fruits and vegetables are becoming more 
important in smallholder cropping patterns and are 
now rivaling maize as the highest income-
generating crops for smallholder farmers. While 
maize is still the dominant crop in terms of area 
cultivated, high-value food crops such as fruits, 
vegetables, and legumes account for a greater share 
of household income (29% of farm household 
income in Kenya and 28% in Mozambique, 
compared with 26 and 23% for maize, 
respectively). In Kenya and Mozambique, the 
smallest farms have the highest share of farm 
income from horticultural crops (Tables 1a-d).  
 
3.  Maize will continue to play a crucial role in 
agricultural productivity growth even if its share of 
farm income and sales revenue may decline 
somewhat over time. Smallholders’ ability to 
diversify into higher valued activities will be 
influenced by the performance of staple food 
markets. If food is reliably available in markets at 
tolerable prices, smallholder farmers are likely to 
shift more of their land and labor into crops that 
provide higher returns and then use the proceeds to 
buy food from the market. Shifts toward higher-
return activities can be a source of major 
productivity and income growth for smallholder 
farmers, but such a strategy depends on reliable 
availability of staple food to buy at tolerable prices.  
 
4.  Cassava production is rising in parts of the 
region. In countries such as Zambia and 
Mozambique, cassava is the most important crop 
contained in the “other staple food crop” category 
(sorghum, millet, rice, and wheat are the others, but 
they are generally very minor). This crop category 
accounts for 39% of farm income in Mozambique, 
20% in Zambia, but only 11% and 9% in Malawi 
and Kenya. Traditional cash crops such as coffee, 
tea, sugarcane, and tobacco are relatively important 
in Kenya (14% of farm income) but account for less 
than 10% of farm income in the other three 
countries. There is substantial regional variation in 
the importance of these traditional cash crops.  
 
5.  The sale of traditional cash crops is also highly 
related to landholding size. In Zambia, Malawi, and 
Mozambique, the farm income share from 
traditional cash crops are from 7 times to over 20 
times higher among households in the top 
landholding size quintile than in the bottom 
quintile. In Kenya, the farm income share of 
traditional cash crops is roughly constant across the 
landholding size quintiles, but in terms of absolute 
gross income, the relatively large farms derive 3-4 
times more gross income from the sale of these 
crops than the smallest farm quintile.  
 
6.   Livestock products form a large share of farm 
income only in one of the four countries examined, 
Kenya, where it comprised 23% of farm income. 
This reflects the importance of commercialized 
dairy production among smallholders in Kenya. 
Livestock product income accounts for less than 
10% of farm income in the other countries.  
 
7.  Smallholder ability to respond to crop marketing 
improvements is constrained by farm structure:  
over half of the small farms in the region are less 
than one hectare in size. One-quarter of the farms 
are less than 0.5 hectares in size. These farms 
cannot earn a viable livelihood through a maize 
commercialization strategy unless there is 
tremendous growth in maize productivity, which 
will require sustained and dedicated investment in 
crop science and extension. Even with major 
improvements in the performance of rural grain 
markets, inadequate access to land will prevent at 
least 30-40% of smallholder farmers from 
producing a grain surplus. The only caveat to this 
conclusion is if new technology is able to achieve 
dramatic gains in productivity growth, and/or if 
governments invest in opening up new areas for 
smallholder-led agriculture.  
 
Hence, without the opening up of new land through 
public investments to encourage new settlement 
and/or substantial maize productivity growth, the 
gradual movement toward smaller farm sizes will 
compel households to adopt more diversified 
commercialization strategies capable of maximizing 
the value of output per scarce unit of land. In highly 
land-constrained areas, it should not be surprising 
to find households shifting out of relatively low-
value maize toward horticulture, tobacco, cotton, 
and niche crops, and then using the revenue to buy 
their staple food needs. Thus, the trend toward 
structural maize deficits is not necessarily a sign of 
failure for the region if small farmers can shift into 
other activities that provide higher incomes. There 
is evidence to suggest that this is already happening 
at least for a sub-set of smallholder farmers in the 
region. Governments may promote more stable 
farm revenue and consumption patterns through 
supporting private systems of input delivery, 
finance, and commodity marketing for a wide range 
of crops given the increasingly dynamic nature of 
African and world agriculture. Such investments 
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stabilization and price support for a dominant staple 
grain to a portfolio approach that puts greater 
emphasis on a range of higher-valued commodities 
while attempting to make the socio-political 
economy less vulnerable to the effects of food price 
instability.  
 
Therefore, the finding that the eastern and southern 
Africa regions are moving into a structural staple 
food-deficit situation may be a consequence of 
rapid urbanization borne of population growth and 
land pressures, and diversification into other crops. 
Yet maize productivity growth will remain a crucial 
objective. If it can be achieved, it will reduce 
import dependence and remain a source of 
dynamism and growth for many small farmers in 
the region. However, broad-based improvements in 
rural livelihoods and incomes will require 
productivity growth for other crops:  oilseed crops, 
horticulture, animal products, and other food crops 
such as cassava.  
 
Smallholders’ position in grain markets:  
Participation of smallholders in markets is 
determined by several factors including their asset 
position (e.g. land, labor, and capital) and access to 
markets. Owing to a highly inegalitarian 
distribution of land within the smallholder sector, 
the marketed grain output in the smallholder sector 
is extremely concentrated. In all the countries in the 
region for which survey data is available, there is a 
recurrent pattern in which roughly 2-3% of 
relatively commercialized smallholder farmers 
account for half or more of the total quantity of 
maize sold by the smallholder sector. Rarely do 
more than 40% of farmers sell grain in any given 
year, not because buyers cannot be found, but more 
fundamentally because the combination of limited 
productive assets and access to improved 
technology precludes them from being able to 
produce a meaningful farm surplus.  
 
Available evidence from nationwide farm 
household surveys for maize indicates that only a 
very small proportion of households buy and sell 
grain in the same year. Small-scale farm households 
generally fall into one of the following four 
categories with respect to grain markets: 
 
i) Sellers of staple grains:   Roughly, 20 to 35% of 
the smallholder farms sell maize in a given year. Of 
course, this figure will rise in good harvest years 
 
and fall in a drought year. However, there are two 
sub-groups within this category:  
 
  a very small group of relatively large and 
well-equipped smallholder farmers with 5 
to 20 hectares of land, usually in the most 
favorable agro-ecological areas. These 
farm households comprise 1 to 3% of the 
national smallholder farm population in 
most countries and account for 50% of the 
marketed output from the smallholder 
sector. The marketed grain surplus is 
extremely concentrated.  
  a much larger group of smallholder farms 
(20 to 30% of the total rural farm 
population) selling much smaller quantities 
of grain, usually between 50kgs to 200kgs 
per farm. These households tend to be 
slightly better off than households that buy 
grain, but the differences are not very great 
in absolute terms. Most of these 
households do not consistently produce a 
surplus – according to repeat panel survey 
data, only about 10-15% of smallholder 
farmers consistently sell grain.  
 
ii) Buyers of staple grains:   these rural households 
generally make up 40-60% of the rural population, 
higher in drought years and lower in good 
production years. These households are generally 
poorer and have smaller farm sizes and asset 
holdings than the median rural household. They are 
directly hurt by higher mean grain prices. 
 
iii) Households buying and selling grain within the 
same year:   In all of the nationwide surveys, 
relatively few households both buy and sell maize 
in the same year (Table 2). Of those who do, many 
of these are relatively large and food secure farms 
with a preference for highly refined commercial 
maize meal; they sell grain and buy back lesser 
amounts of processed meal. About 3 to 11% of the 
farm households nationwide are found to sell grain 
after harvest only to buy back larger quantities later 
in the season. While it is commonly believed that 
the majority of smallholder households make 
distress sales at low prices after harvest followed by 
purchases later in the season when prices are high, 
to our knowledge there is virtually no evidence 
from household survey data to indicate that this 
kind of marketing behavior applies to more than 
10% of the smallholder farm population (row 4 of 
Table 2).  
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Table 2. Distribution of Small-Scale Farm Population According to their Position in the Staple  
Grain Market, Selected Countries 
Household category with respect 












  ---------------------  percent of rural farm population -------------------- 
Sellers only: 
   1. top 50% of total sales
* 
   2. bottom 50% of total sales
** 
21 
  2 
19 
13 
   2 
 11 
18 






  2 
 13 
3.  Buyers only  33  51  55  56  60 
4.  Buy and sell (net buyers)   3     7  5  11 
5.  Buy and sell (net sellers)   5  12
***  12 3  7 












*after ranking all households by quantity sold, this row shows the percentage of households in the smallholder sector  
accounting for the first 50% of total maize sale; 
**percentage of households accounting for the other 50% of total maize sales.    
***The survey in Mozambique was not able to ascertain quantities of maize purchased, therefore, whether these households are 
net buyers or net sellers is unknown. Roughly half of the households in category 5 (who buy and sell in the same year) are 






iv) Households neither buying nor selling staples:  
these households account for between 8% of the 
smallholder sample in Kenya, to roughly 25 to 40% 
in Zambia, Mozambique, and Malawi. These 
households tend to be those residing in the cassava 
zones, where storing cassava in the 
ground and digging it up when needed substitutes 
for maize purchases. There are large portions of the 
region, especially in Zambia, Mozambique, 
Malawi, and Tanzania, where cassava is a major 
staple, and in these areas, a sizable fraction of the 
rural population at the national level is autarkic 
with respect to maize.  
 
Trends in Urban Food Consumption 
Patterns:  The report highlights three main 
findings and their implications for food policy:  
 
1.  Rising Importance of Wheat in Urban Staple 
Food Consumption:  Urban consumption of wheat 
is rising rapidly and has become the dominant 
staple in many cities of East and Southern Africa. 
Table 3 presents the importance of the main staples 
– maize, wheat, rice, and cassava, in urban 
consumers’ diets. These surveys consistently attest 
to the rising importance of wheat products in staple 
food consumption patterns (Muyanga et al. 2005; 
Tschirley and Abdula 2007; Mason and Jayne 
2009). In Zambia, per capita wheat consumption 
has virtually tripled within a 15-year period. 
However, maize is still the dominant staple among 
the 30% to 40% of the poorest urban consumers.  
 
The rising importance of wheat products in urban 
consumption patterns in the region has several 
underlying causes:  i) Urbanization and growing 
preferences for convenience foods; and ii) the price 
of wheat products has declined in many cases 
relative to the price of maize products. We note a 
strong decline in the inflation-adjusted price of 
wheat bread over time, compared to a more modest 
decline (in Zambia and Kenya) or increase (in 
South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique) in the real 
price of maize meal. The gradual decline in the 
retail price of wheat products compared to maize 
meal has contributed to the shift in urban 
consumption patterns over time.  
 
The rising importance of wheat and rice also 
partially reflect African governments’ inability to 
stoke smallholder farmers’ potential to produce 
enough domestically produced staple food to feed 
their rapidly growing urban populations.  
  5Table 3. Staple Food Budget Shares, Urban Centers in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia 
% share of food group in total value of 
consumption of main staples
a 
 
Urban center  Year  Maize Wheat Rice  Cassava 
% share of the 4 
main 
staples in total food 
consumption 
1995  42.4 35.3 22.4  0.0  --  Nairobi, Kenya 
2003 36.3 39.0 24.7  0.0  28.4 
1996 2.6 50.7 35.0 11.7  42.8  Urban Maputo Province 
2002 8.9 57.4 28.9  4.8  27.0 
Urban Northern Mozambique 
(includes Nampula city)
b  2002  32.6 8.2 14.7  44.4 47.5 
Lusaka, Zambia
c 2007/8  39.0  49.4 10.7  0.9  19.5 
Kitwe, Zambia
c 2007/8  42.5  45.3 10.3  2.0  23.2 
Mansa, Zambia
c 2007/8  45.8 28.2 10.0 16.0  23.8 
Sources:  Mason et al (2009a) derived from data in Tschirley and Abdula (2007), Muyanga et al. (2005), Mason et 
al. (2009b). Notes: 
aMain staples refers to maize, wheat, rice, and cassava. Budget shares of these four staple foods 
sum to 100% +/- 0.1%. Shares for Nairobi and Northern Mozambique are % of total food purchases. 
 bCassava 
category also includes potatoes for urban Northern Mozambique (separate figures for cassava only not available). 
cExcludes foods purchased and consumed away from home. -- Information not available. 
 
 
Wheat is currently not well-suited for smallholder 
production in most of Africa. Wheat production 
usually requires capital-intensive investment in 
irrigation and other production technologies. As a 
result, scale economies in production cannot be 
achieved unless large areas can be put under 
production, which is beyond the means of almost all 
smallholders. For these reasons, the growth in wheat 
consumption presents a dilemma. Ideally, economic 
growth is best achieved by rural-urban synergies in 
which urban populations create a market for rural 
producers, while the income received from agriculture 
is used to meet the demand for goods and services 
produced by urbanites. To the extent that urban 
consumption patterns increasingly emphasize products 
produced only by large-scale farmers or procured in 
international markets, the growth in demand for staples 
produced by smallholder farmers will be mitigated. 
 
2.  Rapid investment in medium- and small-scale 
staple food processing and retailing are largely 
responsible for the reductions in marketing margins 
and retail food prices that have been documented in 
much of the region:  In inflation-adjusted terms, the 
unit price of commercial maize meal has declined 
by 30 to 35% in Kenya and Zambia over the 1995-
2009 period. Market liberalization has resulted in 
rapid investment in grain milling, which put 
pressure on the formerly oligopolistic commercial 
milling industry to reduce their margins. As long as 
grain is circulating in informal markets, consumers 
can buy grain and mill it at a neighborhood hammer 
mill, of which there are thousands dotted 
throughout the country. At this time, the structure 
of the market is highly competitive and 
milling/retailing margins are low. In any given area, 
a few large milling firms are competing against 
scores of small-scale millers and retailers for 
consumers’ business. However, later in the season 
when maize sales off the farm tend to dwindle, the 
informal markets become very thinly traded. A 
scarcity of maize grain in local 
markets means that the small- and medium-scale 
processing sector are unable to operate. At this 
time, the structure of the market becomes more 
concentrated, and the demand for large-scale 
commercial millers’ products jumps up as 
consumers now can only procure maize meal from 
this source. Consumers pay substantially higher 
prices for staple maize products at this time.  
 
3. Grain is often unavailable to buy at certain times 
of the year:  Figure 4 shows the responses of urban 
consumers to the question “are there   
times of the year in which you would want to buy  
maize grain in the market but it is not available?  
Yes/no. If yes, what are the most frequent months 
in which maize grain is unavailable to buy?”  The 
harvest in Zambia comes in April/May, and it is 
evident from Figure 4 that local maize supplies in 
informal markets tend to dry up in the 3-4 months 
prior to the harvest.  
 
Why does this occur?  Even when there are 
adequate maize supplies nationally, once grain is 
purchased by the larger traders or by government 
marketing agencies, it generally cannot be accessed 
  6Figure 4.  Percentage of Urban Consumers Indicating That Maize Grain Is Unavailable to Buy in 









































Lusaka 88.9 86.7 53.9 7.9 0 0 0 0 3.5 7.9 12.2 47.2
Kitwe 78.2 70.6 21.2 4.7 9.2 10.8 7.9 6.8 5 9.7 19.7 65.7
Mansa 89.9 82.5 46 5.7 0 0 0 0 0 7.1 24.3 64.1
Kasama 86.2 93.9 73.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.9 1.6 1.6 5.3 37.2







by informal small-scale millers or retailers. Large 
public and private traders sell mainly to commercial 
millers and other industrial buyers. These 
commercial maize products are then distributed 
through a variety of retail channels, including 
informal channels, but these products are relatively 
expensive compared to the less processed and less 
value-added products distributed thorugh informal 
channels which are preferred by most low-income 
consumers.  The drying up of informal markets 
during the hunger season exacerbates low-income 
consumers’ access to food and contributes to food 
insecurity.  
 
During times of regional production shortfalls, 
these problems are accentuated. In such cases, 
imports from South Africa or international markets 
are required. Large-scale imports are usually 
supplied in large transactions to the large millers 
only, again effectively sidelining the small and 
medium-scale processing sector that the poor rely 
on and which exert competitive pressure on the 
large-scale processing sector to trim their margins.  
 
Conclusions:  While improved access to markets 
will support smallholders’ participation in food 
markets, survey data reveal that limited land and 
capital are often the primary reason why the 
majority of smallholder farmers do not sell staple 
foods. Even with major improvements in the 
performance of food markets, a large percentage of 
smallholders will continue to be unable to produce 
a surplus that would enable them to link to markets. 
An important conclusion appears to be, therefore, 
that “access to markets” may not be the primary 
constraint for the bottom 50% of smallholders with 
inadequate land or productive assets to produce a 
staple food surplus in the first place. For this 
bottom 50% of the rural farm population, 
governments face the double burden of providing 
the means to put improved farm technology in their 
hands that is appropriate for their conditions, and 
ensuring that smallholders have access to markets 
that minimize marketing costs. This boils down to 
simultaneous improvements in farm technology 
(including for semi-arid conditions in which a large 
fraction of the smallholder populations in the region 
reside), access to credit, improved rural road, rail 
and port infrastructure, and hospitable conditions 
for private investment in rural input retailing and 
crop assembly. For the top 50% of smallholders 
ranked by land and productive potential, the main 
  7challenges are reducing the transaction costs of 
marketing output and protection against downside 
price risk. 
 
There are major opportunities to improve low-
income rural and urban households’ access to staple 
food by facilitating the development of informal 
marketing channels, specifically by ensuring 
informal traders’ access to imported supplies, not 
just selectively channeling them to the large-scale 
millers. This will ensure greater competition in the 
milling and retailing stages of the food system and 
drive down the cost of staple food to urban 
consumers as well as the large majority of rural 
farm households that are buyers of maize.  
 
Making markets work for smallholder farmers and 
consumers will require actions from many different 
kinds of actors, both in the private and public 
sectors as well as from international financial and 
donor organizations. Our premise, however, is that 
the public sector role is decisive. If public sector 
policy choices do not reduce the currently high 
levels of risk and uncertainty in African food 
markets, and if governments use their scarce 
resources in ways that do not provide greater 
investment incentives for the private sector, then 
there will be very limited scope for the 
development of a market-oriented system to 
provide smallholder farmers with the access to 
markets that they need. A highly uncertain policy 
environment will also continue to scare off bank 
financing for needed investment in the sector. This 
path will lead to frustration over the private sector’s 
apparent unwillingness to invest in support of 
smallholder agriculture.  
 
On the other hand, if African governments define 
their roles clearly, implement these roles 
transparently and consistently, and use their scarce 
resources to invest in public goods that provide new 
profitable opportunities for private sector 
investment, then this approach is likely to fuel 
private sector investment in support of smallholder 
agriculture.  Private capital tends to seek out 
profitable opportunities with tolerable exposure to 
risk. If the conditions are created for profitable and 
stable private investment, the private sector has in 
other parts of the world grown and responded, and 
there is little reason to believe Africa is different. 
Hence, private sector investment patterns and the 
supply of bank financing for private investment, are 
largely  outcomes of public sector behavior – its 
policy choices, integrity of its institutions, and the 
ways it spends its funds through the treasury. For 
these reasons, attention should mainly be focused 
on what the public sector can do in the first place to 
generate the incentives for system-wide private 
investment in staple food markets. Attention is also 
needed on how African governments can best 
address situations of market failure, i.e., where the 
returns to investment are high from a social welfare 
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